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INTRODUCTION 
Almost three years ago, the National Football League (“NFL” 
or “League”) team owners voted unanimously to opt out of the 
current NFL collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”)1 between 
the NFL’s management2 and the NFL’s players3 following the 
2010 season.4  The opt-out has created the need for negotiation of a 
new CBA between the NFL’s management and the NFL’s players 
 
 1 A Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) is a trade agreement between an 
employer and the representative(s) of a unit of employees (usually a union), that governs 
hiring, work, pay and dispute resolution. See J.I. Case Co. v. Labor Bd., 321 U.S. 332, 
334–35 (1944). 
 2 The NFL’s management includes the NFL team owners, the NFL commissioner, and 
other NFL executives. 
 3 The NFL players include the individual NFL players and the NFL players’ union, 
the National Football League Players Association (“NFLPA”).   
 4 See Michael Silver, Fans’ Guide to NFL Labor Battle, YAHOO!SPORTS (Sept. 8, 
2010), http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/news?slug=ms-laborquestions090810. 
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and has set the stage for a labor dispute that has threatened the 
League’s first work stoppage5 since 1987.6 
On September 30, 2010, the Associated Press received a copy 
of a letter sent by the president of the American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (“AFL-CIO”), 
Richard Trumka, to the NFL commissioner, Roger Goodell, and 
the executive director of the National Football League Players 
Association (“NFLPA” or “Union”), DeMaurice Smith.7  In this 
letter, Trumka offered on behalf of the AFL-CIO to mediate the 
NFL’s CBA negotiations in the hope that it would help bring about 
a resolution to the ongoing labor dispute between the NFL’s 
management and players.8 
The NFL’s management rejected Trumka’s offer,9 citing the 
potential for unfair bias against the NFL’s management in any 
AFL-CIO conducted mediation.10  The Union took a different 
position.11  NFLPA spokesman, George Atallah, wrote in an e-
mail, “We welcome the AFL-CIO’s initiative and accept Mr. 
Trumka’s invitation.”12 
While the current CBA is set to expire in March 2011, the two 
sides remain far apart in reaching a new CBA.13  The crucial 
sticking point in reaching a new CBA is the revenue percentage 
that the League should distribute to the players at the end of each 
 
 5 A work stoppage occurs when there is either a lockout or a strike. Labor Pains, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseball/news/2002/05/25/work_ 
stopppages (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).  A lockout occurs when, during labor 
negotiations, an employer attempts to put economic pressure on employees by refusing to 
allow them to work. Robert H. Lattinville, et al., Labor Pain: The Effect of a Work 
Stoppage in the NFL on its Coaches, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 335, 337 (2010).  A strike 
occurs when employees refuse to perform work for their employer in support of a 
bargaining position or in protest of some aspect of a previous labor agreement. Id. 
 6 See Silver, supra note 4. 
 7 See AFL-CIO Prez Offers Help to NFL, NFLPA, ESPN (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://sports. espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=5633268 [hereinafter AFL-CIO Prez]. 
 8 See id. 
 9 Id.  
 10 Id. (explaining that the NFLPA is a member of the AFL-CIO and that Mr. Smith sits 
on the AFL-CIO’s board). 
 11 See id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 See NFL Owners to Meet March 3—The Day the CBA Expires, TSN, 
http://www.tsn.ca/nfl/story/?id=353883&asid=b5a23735 (last visited Feb. 15, 2011). 
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season.14  Under the most recent CBA, which was implemented in 
2006, the players received 59.6% of designated League revenues.15  
League owners say that if the League wants to remain profitable, 
that number must be decreased.16  The Union has refused to 
consider negotiating this decrease without proof of the League’s 
financial hardship—something the League has been unwilling to 
offer.17  Labor talks have also been made more difficult because 
Goodell and Smith are conducting their first CBA negotiations as 
leaders of their respective organizations.18 
The current NFL labor dispute and potential work stoppage 
could delay, or even worse, result in the cancellation of the 2011–
2012 NFL season.19  A season-long work stoppage could “cost 
thousands of Americans their jobs and cities more than $140 
million in revenue.”20  It could also cost the League $1 billion in 
lost revenue.21  As the NFL labor dispute highlights, labor disputes 
can be detrimental not only to professional sports leagues, but to 
national economies as well. 
This Note uses the current labor dispute between the NFL’s 
management and the NFL’s players as an example of how properly 
conducted mediation can help to resolve labor disputes between 
management and players in professional sports leagues.  A 
collaborative approach to resolving this labor dispute is essential 
for NFL players and owners, who depend on one another for 
financial success.  The NFL should be capable of resolving this 
dispute efficiently, effectively, and in a manner that strengthens 
relationships amongst the players, the owners, the League’s 
business partners, and the NFL’s fans. 
 
 14 Silver, supra note 4. 
 15 Id. 
 16 AFL-CIO Prez, supra note 7 (stating that huge debts from building stadiums and 
starting the NFL television network make it impossible to stay profitable). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Michael J. Redding & Daniel R. Peterson, Third and Long: The Issues Facing the 
NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement Negotiations and the Effects of an Uncapped 
Year, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 95, 97 (2009). 
 19 See AFL-CIO Prez, supra note 7. 
 20 Id. 
21  Barry Wilner, Lockout Could Cost NFL $1-Billion, GLOBE & MAIL (Oct. 13, 2010), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/sports/football/lockout-could-cost-nfl-1-billion/ 
article1755865/?cmpid=rss1 [hereinafter Wilner, Lockout]. 
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Part I of this Note defines alternative dispute resolution 
(“ADR”) and discusses how ADR has been utilized to resolve 
labor disputes in professional sports.  Part II of this Note covers the 
legal and factual background behind the NFL dispute.  It discusses 
the history of labor relations within the four major United States 
professional sports leagues,22 with an emphasis on the evolution of 
labor relations and collective bargaining between the NFL’s 
management and the NFLPA.  Part III summarizes the current 
NFL labor dispute, with a breakdown of the NFL management’s 
and the NFLPA’s respective positions on the critical components 
of the next NFL CBA.  Part IV of this Note explains the ways in 
which mediation can help resolve the labor clash between the 
NFL’s management and the NFLPA so that a new CBA can be 
agreed upon before a work stoppage occurs.  Lastly, Part V 
proposes specific mediation guidelines that could help these 
parties, and potentially other professional sports leagues with 
similar disputes, reach an agreement on a new CBA.  This proposal 
recognizes “the significance of the bargaining history between the 
parties as well as the unique nature of the professional sports 
industry.”23 
I. THE OPENING KICK: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN 
SPORTS 
Alternative dispute resolution is a method of using extrajudicial 
means, including arbitration and mediation, to resolve disputes.24  
It has been successfully used to resolve conflicts in a wide range of 
fields.25 
 
 22 The four major United States professional sports leagues include Major League 
Baseball (“MLB”), the National Basketball Association (“NBA”), the National Hockey 
League (“NHL”), and the NFL. See Matt Cutler, Big Four U.S. Sports Enjoy Sponsorship 
Hike, SPORTSBUS. (Nov. 19, 2010, 9:25 AM), http://www.sportbusiness.com/ 
news/182615/big-four-us-sports-enjoy-sponsorship-hike. 
 23 Ethan Lock, The Scope of the Labor Exemption in Professional Sports, 1989 DUKE 
L.J. 339, 343. 
 24 2009 Annual Survey: Recent Developments in Sports Law, 20 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 
497, 498 (2009). 
 25 These include disputes involving employment, intellectual property, consumer, 
technology, health care, financial services, construction, and international trade conflicts. 
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Arbitration is a contractually agreed upon alternative to 
litigation in the event of a legal dispute.26  It is a process whereby 
the parties to a contract present their side of a legal dispute to “one 
or more impartial persons— “arbitrators”—for a final and binding 
decision, known as an ‘award.’”27  Awards are issued through 
written decision by an arbitrator and are prohibitively difficult to 
overturn.28  The reasons contracting parties normally prefer 
arbitration to litigation is that it is time-effective, cost-effective, 
informal, confidential, and binding.29 
Mediation occurs when two or more disputing parties have 
been unable to resolve a conflict.30  The parties use an impartial 
third party—a “mediator”—who lacks authority to force a 
settlement, to help them negotiate a settlement of their own 
creation.31  The mediator is often an expert in the legal area or 
industry in which the dispute occurs.32  Mediation is ideal for those 
who want to participate in “determining the outcome of a dispute 
because it provides an opportunity for parties . . . to work through 
issues with the assistance of an impartial third person trained to 
facilitate resolution.”33  Similar to arbitration, mediation is often 
preferable to litigation because it is time-effective, cost-effective, 
 
See Dispute Resolution Services, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/drs (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2010). 
 26 Arbitration, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://adr.org/sp.asp?id=28749 (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2010).  
 27 Id. 
 28 Martin J. Greenberg, Alternative Dispute Resolution in Sports Facility Leases, 16 
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 99, 102 (2005) [hereinafter Greenberg, Sports Facility Leases]; 
see also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1767 (2010) (“It 
is only when an arbitrator strays from interpretation and application of the agreement and 
effectively dispenses his own brand of industrial justice that his decision may be 
unenforceable.” (quoting Major League Baseball Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 
(2001))). 
 29 See Greenberg, Sports Facility Leases, supra note 28, at 101. 
 30 What is Mediation?, AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://www.aaamediation.com/faces/ 
index.jspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). 
 31 Id. 
 32 See Cheryl Cutrona, Considering Mediation? Looking for a Mediator? Some 
Information to Help You Select a Mediator, PA. COUNCIL OF MEDIATORS, http://www. 
pamediation.org/archives/How_to_Select_a_Mediator.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2011). 
 33 What is Mediation?, supra note 30. 
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informal, and confidential.34  It is also important to note that 
“mediation is prospective rather than retrospective”;35 instead of 
analyzing the parties’ past relationship, mediation tries to resolve 
how the parties can work together in the future to achieve common 
gains.36 
Given the unique characteristics of the twenty-first century 
sports industry, it is not surprising that alternative dispute 
resolution has become the predominant mechanism by which 
disputes get resolved within professional sports leagues.37  
Whereas the litigation process usually becomes protracted, in 
sports business, disputes must often be resolved quickly.38  
Alternative dispute resolution provides the sports industry with an 
effective means for fast and reliable dispute resolution.  Moreover, 
because of the confidential nature of alternative dispute resolution, 
very little information is communicated to the public regarding the 
dispute.39  “This is particularly valuable to an industry which on 
the one hand, is very conscious of its public image and, on the 
other hand, is subjected to the constant probing of the news 
media.”40 
Today, most CBAs between a professional sports league and a 
players’ union include a provision mandating arbitration in the 
case of certain types of disputes.41  Such disputes typically involve 
issues such as “injury grievances, employment grievances, and 
players’ salary arbitration.”42  Arbitration has also been used to 
resolve disputes over sports facility leases and the administration 
of “franchise, joint-venture, and partnership disputes . . . such as 
 
 34 See Benefits of Mediation, MEDIATE, http://www.mediate.com/articles/benefits.cfm 
(last visited Nov. 8, 2010). 
 35 What is Mediation?, supra note 30. 
 36 Id. 
 37 See Greenberg, Sports Facility Leases, supra note 28, at 100 (quoting MARTIN J. 
GREENBERG, THE STADIUM GAME 532 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter GREENBERG, STADIUM 
GAME]). 
 38 See id. at 101. 
 39 See id. at 101–02. 
 40 See id. at 102 (quoting MARTIN J. GREENBERG, SPORTS LAW PRACTICE 73 (1993) 
[hereinafter GREENBERG, SPORTS LAW]). 
 41 See id. at 100 (quoting Sports Arbitration Including Olympic Athlete Disputes, AM. 
ARBITRATION ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22022 (last visited Nov. 14, 2005)). 
 42 Id. 
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disputes over partnership proceeds, termination of sports 
executives, the sale of a franchise, and payments under executive 
or partnership agreements.”43 
Mediation has also played a crucial role in resolving major 
disputes in professional sports.  Cases have involved conflicts 
regarding facility cost,44 coach compensation,45 league television 
broadcast rights,46 and team ownership rights.47  Mediation has 
been integral in helping leagues and player unions reach 
agreements during the collective bargaining process as well.48 
II. PLAYING BALL: LABOR RELATIONS IN UNITED STATES 
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES 
Labor relations in the four major United States professional 
sports leagues have been notoriously contentious since the creation 
of the first of the four major professional sports leagues during the 
“Robber Barron” era.49  Starting with the inception of professional 
 
 43 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 44 See, e.g., District of Columbia, MLB Reach Revised Agreement, ESPN (Jan. 27, 
2006, 7:52 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/mlb/news/story?id=2308920 (discussing a 
revised lease for a Washington Nationals baseball stadium). 
 45 See, e.g., Cuban-Nelson Dispute Headed to Mediation, CBS SPORTS, 
http://www.cbssports.com/nba/story/11310151 (last visited Nov. 3, 2010) (discussing 
former coach Don Nelson’s compensation package). 
 46 See, e.g., John Ourand, NFL Network, Comcast Hold Mediation Meetings Over 
Carriage, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. DAILY (Aug. 6, 2008), 
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/123010 (discussing the carriage dispute 
between Comcast and the NFL Network). 
 47 See Greg Risling, McCourt Divorce Trial: Mediation Scheduled for Friday, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sep. 22, 2010, 8:40 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2010/09/22/mccourt-divorce-trial-med_n_734827.html. 
 48 See Liz Mullen, Sports Labor is Familiar Ground for Mediator, STREET & SMITH’S 
SPORTS BUS. J., Mar. 15, 2010, at 40.   
 49 See Ethan M. Lewis, “A Structure To Last Forever”: The Players’ League and The 
Brotherhood War of 1890, ETHANLEWIS.ORG, http://www.ethanlewis.org/pl/ch2.html (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2010).  A robber baron is “an American capitalist of the latter part of the 
19th century who became wealthy through exploitation (as of natural resources, 
governmental influence, or low wage scales).” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 1077 (11th ed. 2003), available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/robber%20baron.  The robber barons created monopolies, and the 
Sherman Act was enacted “as a response to the growth of monopolies that threatened to 
destroy competition in the marketplace.” Lawrence M. Salinger, Introduction to 
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baseball in 1871 when the National Association of Professional 
Base Ball Players was formed, professional baseball was initially a 
player-controlled enterprise.50  However, this changed when the 
National League of Professional Baseball Clubs (“National 
League”)51 was founded in 1876.52  The founders of the National 
League considered it to be a “league of ball club owners, to whom 
the players were only employees.”53 
To help implement their vision of organized professional 
baseball, National League team owners created the “reserve 
clause” system.54  This clause quickly became a part of every 
player contract that each individual player signed when joining a 
team and stated that upon the expiration of any player’s contract, 
the rights to the player were retained by the team to which he 
signed.55  Essentially, this meant that although both the player’s 
obligation to play for the team and the team’s obligation to pay the 
player had ended, the player could never enter a contract with 
another team.56  Thus, the player was forced to negotiate a new 
contract with the same team, request a trade, or quit playing 
professional baseball.57  If the player refused to honor his existing 
contract due to the contract’s terms, he was blacklisted.58  The 
reserve clause system represented an act of collusion by the owners 
and laid the ground work for a monopoly.59  Professional baseball 
 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WHITE-COLLAR & CORPORATE CRIME, at ix (Lawrence M. Salinger ed., 
2005). 
 50 See Lewis, supra note 49. 
 51 See Michael J. Haupert, The Economic History of Major League Baseball, EH.NET 
(Feb. 1, 2010, 5:21 PM), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/haupert.mlb.  The National 
League was the older of two professional baseball leagues that would ultimately combine 
to form Major League Baseball (“MLB”). Id. 
 52 See Lewis, supra note 49. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See id. 
 55 See id. The NFL, NBA, and NHL also adopted the reserve system or some variation 
of it. See Jonathan B. Goldberg, Player Mobility in Professional Sports: From the 
Reserve System to Free Agency, 15 SPORTS LAW. J. 21, 22–25 (2008). 
 56 See Lewis, supra note 49. 
 57 Id. 
 58 This meant that all National League team owners collectively agreed not to offer the 
player a new contract. See id. 
 59 See id. 
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players did not have a strong union during the nineteenth century, 
and as a result, did little to challenge the clause.60 
As professional baseball entered the twentieth century, 
National League owners increasingly imposed their will on 
National League players.  Team owners had complete financial 
control over the players on their respective teams, with no realistic 
possibility of competition for player services from elsewhere.61  
Whatever competition for signing players existed from other 
leagues was thwarted by the National League, either by way of 
crushing it with superior financial might or by merger.62  This was 
most evident in 1903 when the American League merged with the 
National League to form what eventually became Major League 
Baseball (“MLB”).63  This agreement also tied independent 
contracts (those contracts that were not previously National League 
contracts) to the National League reserve clause system.64 
A. Changing the Rules of the Game: Antitrust Law 
While team owners consolidated power over the players, 
important legislation was making its way through Congress that 
would not only severely impact labor relations in professional 
baseball, but ultimately, labor relations in the remainder of the four 
major United States professional sports leagues. 
In response to the “Robber Baron” era, Congress developed 
antitrust law to promote competition between companies involved 
in interstate commerce.  The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (the 
“Sherman Act”) “preserves ‘free and unfettered competition’ in the 
marketplace, which ‘will yield the best allocation of economic 
 
 60 See History of the Major League Baseball Players Association, MLBPLAYERS.COM, 
http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/history.jsp (last visited Nov. 5, 2010) (“Opposed to 
baseball’s reserve clause and a growing movement led by Albert Spalding to cap players’ 
salaries, John Montgomery Ward and eight other players in 1885 formed the first players 
union in baseball—the Brotherhood of Professional Base Ball Players. . . . None of those 
efforts proved sufficient in bringing an end to the reserve clause, which bound players to 
their respective clubs.”). 
 61 Id. 
 62 See Haupert, supra note 51 (discussing the National League’s buyout deal with the 
Player’s League and merger with the American Association). 
 63 See id. 
 64 See Goldberg, supra note 55, at 41. 
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resources of the country, the lowest prices, the highest quality and 
greatest material progress.’”65  Section 1 of the Sherman Act is 
designed to prohibit contracts, combinations or conspiracies that 
unreasonably restrain trade.66  Section 2 prohibits 
monopolization.67 
Violations of Section 1 have been found to include horizontal 
price fixing,68 market allocations,69 and group boycotts.70  These 
Section 1 violations are deemed per se illegal under the Sherman 
Act because “their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any 
redeeming value are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable.”71  
Other restraints of trade are analyzed under the “Supreme Court’s 
‘rule of reason’ [test], which weighs the procompetitive benefits 
and the anticompetitive effects of an agreement in order to 
determine whether it should survive antitrust scrutiny.”72 
In order to commit a Section 2 violation, an entity must both 
possess monopoly power and engage in anticompetitive conduct.73  
 
 65 Goldberg, supra note 55, at 27 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 
1, 4 (1958) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 66 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 67 See id. § 2 (“Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or 
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed 
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding 
$100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment 
not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.”). 
 68 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222 (1940).  Horizontal 
Price Fixing refers to an agreement between two or more parties, generally considered to 
be competitors, to set, maintain, and charge a specified price for a particular product. See 
id. at 213. 
 69 United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).  Market allocations 
are agreements in which competitors divide markets among themselves either by types of 
customers, products, or territories. See id.  
 70 Fashion Originators’ Guild v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 312 U.S. 457, 465 (1941) (citing 
E. States Retail Lumber Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 609–11 (1914)). 
A group boycott is a type of boycott in which two or more competitors in a relevant 
market refuse to conduct business with a firm. See id. at 461. 
 71 See Goldberg, supra note 55, at 28 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 
U.S. 1, 5 (1958)). 
 72 Id. (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984)). 
 73 See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 377 (1973) (“Use of 
monopoly power ‘to destroy threatened competition’ is a violation of the ‘attempt to 
monopolize’ clause of § 2 of the Sherman Act.  So are agreements not to compete, with 
the aim of preserving or extending a monopoly.” (citations omitted)). 
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Monopoly power is often demonstrated by showing that the 
challenged entity has significant market share and has engaged in 
exclusionary behavior without a valid business reason.74 
B. Antitrust Law and its Impact on the Four Major United States 
Professional Sports Leagues 
Initially, MLB was granted an antitrust exemption.75  In 
American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase,76 the New 
York State Supreme Court held: 
It is apparent from the analysis already set forth . . . 
that a monopoly of baseball as a business has been 
ingeniously devised and created in so far as a 
monopoly can be created among free men; but I 
cannot agree to the proposition that the business of 
baseball for profit is interstate trade or commerce, 
and therefore subject to the provisions of the 
Sherman Act.77 
The United States Supreme Court reinforced the New York 
Supreme Court’s holding when in Federal Base Ball Club of 
Baltimore, Inc. v. National League,78 it held that the National 
League was not subject to the Sherman Act “because major league 
baseball was not interstate commerce.”79  The Court stated that 
“the ‘business of giving exhibitions’ was ‘purely state affairs,’ and 
thus not interstate in nature.”80 
The United States Supreme Court revisited the Federal Base 
Ball Club precedent in 1953.81  In Toolson v. New York Yankees,82 
 
 74 Id. at 377, 388. 
 75 See Goldberg, supra note 55, at 29 (explaining that “baseball avoided antitrust 
liability because courts held that the business of baseball was not interstate commerce” 
(quoting Am. League Baseball Club of Chi. v. Chase, 149 N.Y.S. 6, 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1914))). 
 76 149 N.Y.S. 6, 16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1914). 
 77 See Goldberg, supra note 55, at 29 (quoting Am. League Baseball Club of Chi., 149 
N.Y.S. at 16). 
 78 259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922). 
 79 See Goldberg, supra note 55, at 29 (citing Fed. Base Ball Club of Balt. v. Nat’l 
League of Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922)). 
 80 Id. (quoting Fed. Base Ball Club of Balt., 259 U.S. at 208). 
 81 See Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953). 
C06_CORAPI_20110425 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2011  6:42 PM 
2011] HUDDLE UP 801 
the Court found that because Congress had not acted during the 
thirty years since Federal Base Ball Club to make professional 
baseball subject to antitrust law, Congress implicitly agreed with 
the Supreme Court’s earlier finding that antitrust law does not 
apply to the business of professional baseball.83  Accordingly, the 
court held, reserve clauses in player contracts were valid, 
regardless of their monopolistic tendencies.84 
In 1972, MLB’s antitrust exemption was once again challenged 
in Flood v. Kuhn.85  After reviewing both Federal Base Ball Club 
and Toolson, the Court held that baseball’s reserve clause system 
enjoyed exemption from antitrust law, which made it “an exception 
and an anomaly.”86  However, while the Court recognized the 
incongruity of this past precedent with federal antitrust law, it 
refused to disturb its precedent, leaving it for Congress to remedy 
the situation.87  Congress eventually did so in 1988 with the 
passage of the Curt Flood Act which significantly limited MLB’s 
antitrust exemption.88 
To this day, no other major United States professional sports 
league has ever received a federal antitrust exemption.  In 
Radovich v. NFL,89 a professional football player brought an 
antitrust suit against the NFL alleging violations of Sections 1 and 
2 of the Sherman Act.90  The NFL argued that because professional 
baseball was exempt from federal antitrust law, professional 
football should be exempt as well.91  The Supreme Court, however, 
decided to limit the exemption to organized professional 
 
 82 346 U.S. 356 (1953). 
 83 See id. at 357. 
 84 Id.; see supra notes 48–56 and accompanying text. 
 85 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
 86 Goldberg, supra note 55, at 31 (citing Fed. Base Ball Club of Balt., 259 U.S. at 282). 
 87 See id. 
 88 See Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–297, § 2, 112 Stat. 2824. The Curt 
Flood Act’s purpose was to remove Major League Baseball’s antitrust exemption, but it 
largely reaffirmed it. See Goldberg, supra note 55, at 31. 
 89 352 U.S. 445, 446 (1957). 
 90 Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 446–47 (1957). 
 91 Id. at 449–50. 
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baseball.92  Following the Radovich precedent, district courts went 
on to hold that the National Hockey League (“NHL”) and the 
National Basketball Association (“NBA”) were subject to federal 
antitrust law.93  The holding of Radovich was recently reinforced 
when the Supreme Court found that the NFL’s licensing activities 
are not exempt from antitrust scrutiny under Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.94 
C. Labor Law, Labor Unions, and the Labor Exemption 
Unlike MLB, the players in the NFL, the NBA, and the NHL 
have always been able to challenge the reserve system and other 
anticompetitive league practices under federal antitrust law.95  
However, an important subsequent development has effectively 
allowed for league exemption from antitrust liability in most 
cases.96  This has occurred because players in all four of the major 
United States professional sports leagues “unionize[d] and 
designate[d] representatives of the players associations to negotiate 
with team owners.”97 
The National Labor Relations Act grants employees the right to 
self-organize and to bargain collectively with their employer.98  If 
employees elect a labor union to represent them, they lose their 
right to bargain individually.99  By joining their economic strength 
and acting through a labor union, employees have the best chance 
of bargaining for improvements in wages, hours and working 
 
 92 See id. at 451–52 (confining the scope of the antitrust exemption because the 
business of baseball fell “outside the scope of the [Sherman] Act” and not other 
businesses as well). 
 93 See Goldberg, supra note 55, at 30–31 (citing Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Phila. World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Phila. Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. 
Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972)). 
 94 See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130, S. Ct. 2201, 2206–07 (2010). 
 95 See Goldberg, supra note 55, at 31. 
 96 See generally Jeffrey Hoffmeyer, Fourth Down and an Appeal: The Nonstatutory 
Exemption to Antitrust Law in Clarett v. National Football League, 13 SPORTS LAW. J. 
193 (2006) (discussing Clarett v. Nat’l Football League, 369 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
 97 Id. at 199. 
 98 See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 93–360, 88 Stat. 395 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (1974)). 
 99 See Michael S. Jacobs & Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Antitrust Principles and Collective 
Bargaining by Athletes: Of Superstars in Peonage, 81 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1971). 
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conditions.100  However, as discussed above, Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act prohibits certain agreements which restrain trade in 
interstate commerce.101  Labor unions, by their very nature, often 
engage in trade restriction when they make agreements with 
management for better working conditions.102  Therefore, to shield 
unions from antitrust liability, a statutory “labor exemption” was 
created under the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia Act.103 
This statutory labor exemption was later expanded by the 
addition of a nonstatutory labor exemption.104  The nonstatutory 
labor exemption is a judicially derived expansion of the statutory 
labor exemption that protects good faith union-management 
interaction from antitrust scrutiny.105  Thus, the Supreme Court has 
explained that any term of a league-player union agreement that is 
the product of arm’s-length negotiation (e.g., the terms of a league 
CBA) will receive protection from antitrust law, regardless of the 
agreement’s collusive or anticompetitive nature.106 
D. The NFL 
The NFL began operating in 1920107 and is an unincorporated 
association comprised of member clubs which own and operate 
professional football teams.108  Mainstream America began to 
follow the NFL during Bert Bell’s tenure as League 
Commissioner.109  However, “professional football truly began to 
make strides with the rise of Commissioner Pete Rozelle.”110  
 
 100 See id. at 8 (quoting NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967)). 
 101 See Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 102 See generally Goldberg, supra note 55, at 32 (“[L]abor and antitrust laws are in 
conflict, as one promotes and the other discourages combinations . . . .”). 
 103 See Hoffmeyer, supra note 96, at 195–96. 
 104 Id. at 196 (citing United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941)). 
 105 See id. 
 106 See Brown v. Prof’l Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 235 (1996) (holding that the non-
statutory exemption is applicable to good-faith bargaining between the NFL and NFL 
players). 
 107 See Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 610 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 108 See id. 
 109 Jeffrey F. Levine & Bram A. Maravent, Fumbling Away the Season: Will the 
Expiration of the NFL-NFLPA CBA Result in the Loss of the 2011 Season and Beyond?, 
20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1419, 1426 (2010). 
 110 Id.  
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Commissioner Rozelle developed the concept of “league think,” an 
initiative aimed at convincing large market owners to “forego 
lucrative local television contracts in favor of a deal that equally 
benefited every franchise.”111  Over time, national television 
contracts with NBC and CBS provided financial security for 
member franchises.112  They also facilitated a business model that 
allowed the NFL to promote “economic and competitive parity 
amongst its clubs.”113  However, it was the NFL’s strongest 
business competitor, the American Football League (“AFL”), that 
first demonstrated the economic effectiveness of a cooperative 
television plan for professional football.114 
Interleague tensions peaked in 1966.  After former AFL 
Commissioner and current Oakland Raiders owner, Al Davis, 
actively recruited players from NFL teams, the two leagues spent a 
combined $7 million to sign their 1966 college draft choices.115  
While Davis and other members of AFL management intended to 
enhance interleague competition, some AFL and NFL owners saw 
this volatile situation as detrimental to both leagues.116  As a result, 
after a series of secret meetings between both sides, the AFL 
merged to become a part of the NFL on June 8, 1966.117  Congress 
approved the merger, passing legislation exempting the agreement 
from antitrust scrutiny on October twenty-first of the same year.118  
With that, the modern day NFL was born. 
 
 111 See id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 See id. at 1427. 
 115 See NFL, THE OFFICIAL 2010 NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE RECORD AND FACT 
BOOK 359 (2010) [hereinafter NFL], available at http://static.nfl.com/static/content/ 
public/image/history/pdfs/History/Chronology.pdf (stating that Al Davis became 
Commissioner of the AFL in 1966 after the resignation of Commissioner Joe Foss); see 
also B. Duane Cross, The AFL: A Football Legacy, CNN SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Jan. 22, 
2001, 2:57 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/football/news/2001/01/22/afl_history_2. 
 116 See Michael Schulze, How Al Davis Just Saved the NFL—Again, BLEACHER RPT. 
(Feb. 27, 2009), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/131186-al-davis-just-saved-the-nfl-
again. 
 117 See NFL, supra note 115, at 359. 
 118 Id. 
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E. The NFLPA: The Blitz on Ownership Begins 
The formation of the NFLPA began at a meeting before the 
start of the 1956 NFL Championship game.119  Annoyed that the 
owners had rejected a player proposal that included a minimum 
yearly player salary, a player per diem, and a rule requiring 
payment of salary to injured players, the NFL players sought out 
Creighton Miller120 to become their legal counsel.121  Eventually 
players signed authorization cards which allowed Miller to become 
their leader in 1956.122  For the first time in history, the NFL 
players formed a united labor front, calling their organization the 
“NFLPA.”123 
NFL ownership initially refused to acknowledge the new 
association.124  However, in 1957, Detroit Lions lineman Bill 
Radovich brought suit under the Sherman Act, and as discussed 
above, the Supreme Court held professional football to be subject 
to antitrust law.125  As a result of the legal leverage that the players 
gained over the owners from this decision, the owners had no 
choice but to acknowledge the NFLPA and to agree to several of 
the players’ earlier proposals.126 
While the Radovich decision signaled a major victory for the 
NFL players, the NFLPA remained in a precarious position due to 
the 1966 merger of the AFL with the NFL.127  The NFLPA 
represented the sixteen NFL teams that were a part of the NFL 
 
 119 See Goldberg, supra note 55, at 39. 
 120 Creighton Miller was the first general manager for the Cleveland Browns, a former 
University of Notre Dame football player, and an attorney. See History: The Beginning—
1956, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, http://www.nflplayers.com/About-us/History (last visited 
Nov. 7, 2010). 
 121 See id. 
 122 See id. 
 123 See id. (“Their first meeting took place at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York in 
November of 1956 . . . .”). 
 124 See id. 
 125 See Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). 
 126 See History: The Beginning—1956, supra note 120. 
 127 See Levine & Maravent, supra note 109, at 1432 (stating that player solidarity 
became a significant issue of concern for the Union in 1956). 
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prior to the merger.128  However, after the merger, the ten 
additional AFL teams that joined the NFL continued to be 
represented by the American Football League Players Association 
(“AFLPA”)129 rather than the NFLPA.130  Player unity became a 
significant cause of concern.131 
As the NFL players’ lack of harmony weakened their ability to 
negotiate with the League, players sought help from the AFL-CIO 
in creating a formal labor union.132  Although the AFL-CIO was 
not interested in helping, the Teamsters Union was and wanted to 
represent the players in collective bargaining with the League.133  
Nevertheless, Creighton Miller refused to consider it.134  As a 
result, a split occurred between the AFLPA and the NFLPA which 
would significantly hurt the players, as it enabled the league to pit 
one group against the other in its negotiation strategy.135 
The NFL’s management refused to negotiate with the divided 
players and also orchestrated an ownership lockout in 1968.136  
This resulted in a short work stoppage.137  While this incident 
ultimately produced the first NFL management-NFLPA CBA,138 it 
was clear that the players’ lack of unity left them with less than 
they had hoped for from the NFL’s management.139 
The NFLPA turned a corner in 1970.  After years of fighting 
amongst the players, the AFLPA and the NFLPA merged, as 
 
 128 History: The 1960’s—AFL/NFL Competition, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, 
http://www.nflplayers.com/About-us/History (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) [hereinafter 
History: The 1960’s]. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 See History: The 1960’s, supra note 128. 
 133 See id. (“Bernie Parrish of the Cleveland Browns asked George Meany of the AFL-
CIO to help form a union of professional athletes.”). 
 134 Id. 
 135 See id. 
 136 Levine & Maravent, supra note 109, at 11. 
 137 History: The 1960’s, supra note 128.   
 138 Id.  
 139 Id. 
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collective bargaining with the NFL owners loomed.140  John 
Mackey of the Baltimore Colts was named NFLPA President.141 
Owners were willing to negotiate a new collective bargaining 
agreement with the newly formed union, but only if several 
conditions were met.142  Among those conditions was that no 
NFLPA or NFL lawyers, other than each party’s respective 
General Counsel, be present at the negotiations.143  Despite the 
potential for abuse of such a condition, the negotiations were 
held.144  When Mackey arrived at the negotiations, he was greeted 
by nine NFL attorneys.145  Mackey’s own attorney then proceeded 
to advise Mackey to sign a document that would have resulted in 
the NFLPA being bound to the owners’ offer “in perpetuity.”146  
Realizing that he was being ambushed (and poorly counseled), 
Mackey briefly suspended negotiations and sought the help of the 
labor law firm, Lindquist & Vennum.147  The firm advised the 
players to file a petition with the National Labor Relations Board 
(“NLRB”) to become a recognized union.148  Player 
representatives ultimately agreed and the NLRB granted 
certification to the NFLPA.149 
In addition to recommending that the players petition the 
NLRB, Lindquist & Vennum assigned Ed Garvey to work with 
Mackey.150  Strengthened by the newly formed union, the players 
opted to challenge the most controversial labor issue between the 
players and owners: the Rozelle Rule.151 
 
 140 History: The 1970’s—AFL and NFL Players Associations Merge, NFL PLAYERS 
ASS’N, http://www.nflplayers.com/About-us/History (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) 
[hereinafter History: The 1970’s]. 
 141 Levine & Maravent, supra note 109, at 1433. 
 142 See History: The 1970’s, supra note 140. 
 143 See id. 
 144 See id. 
 145 See id. 
 146 Levine & Maravent, supra note 109, at 1433. 
 147 See id. He also fired his attorney. Id. 
 148 See History: The 1970’s, supra note 140. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Levine & Maravent, supra note 109, at 1433. Garvey ultimately left the firm and 
became the Union’s first Executive Director. Id. 
 151 See C. Peter Goplerud III, Collective Bargaining in the National Football League: A 
Historical and Comparative Analysis, 4 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 13, 16 (1997). 
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F. “No Freedom, No Football”152: The Rozelle Rule and Mackey 
v. NFL 
The Rozelle Rule “allowed a player to change teams at the 
conclusion of his contract if he could negotiate a new deal with a 
new club; however, the new club was required to compensate the 
old club for the loss of the player.”153  The two teams involved in 
the player transaction were to determine the terms of 
compensation, either in the form of players or cash.154 “If the 
teams could not reach an agreement, the compensation was to be 
set by [Commissioner Rozelle].”155  The apparent purpose and 
effect of this rule was to limit free agency156 and player 
movement.157  Commissioner Rozelle believed that “if players 
were given complete freedom to negotiate their services, the 
League would be dominated by a few rich teams and would 
eventually lose both fan interest and revenue.”158 
As a result of the Rozelle Rule, the first major NFL work 
stoppage occurred in 1974.159  Outraged by the restrictions that the 
Rozelle Rule placed on player services, the players went on a strike 
that lasted forty-four days.160  However, the strike left the union 
sharply divided, underfunded and unable to defeat the League’s 
implementation of the Rozelle Rule.161  After another failed strike 
attempt in 1975, the Union sought help from the court.162  The 
result was Mackey v. NFL.163 
In Mackey, Mackey and several other NFL players filed suit 
against the League, claiming that the Rozelle Rule was an 
 
 152 “No Freedom, No Football” was the NFL players’ rallying cry as collective 
bargaining with the owners began in 1974. See History: The 1970’s, supra note 140. 
 153 Goplerud, supra note 151, at 16. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. 
 156 A “Free Agent” is a professional athlete who is “free to negotiate a contract with any 
team.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 498 (11th ed. 2003), available at 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/free%20agent. 
 157 Goplerud, supra note 151, at 16. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id.  
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Levine & Maravent, supra note 109, at 1435. 
 163 Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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unreasonable restraint of trade and thus violated Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.164  Given the Supreme Court’s establishment of the 
nonstatutory labor exemption, the Eighth Circuit used a three-part 
test to determine when a management-player union agreement 
would be granted a nonstatutory labor exemption from antitrust 
scrutiny: 
First, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining 
may potentially be given pre-eminence over the 
antitrust laws where the restraint on trade primarily 
affects only the parties to the collective bargaining 
relationship.  Second, federal labor policy is 
implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the 
agreement sought to be exempted concerns a 
mandatory subject of collective bargaining.  Finally, 
the policy favoring collective bargaining is 
furthered to the degree necessary to override the 
antitrust laws only where the agreement sought to 
be exempted is a product of bona fide arm’s-length 
bargaining.165 
In applying this test, the court found for Mackey.166  The court 
found that the provision passed parts one and two of its test, but 
that it failed part three.167  The court reasoned that the Rozelle Rule 
had “not been the subject of bona fide arm’s-length bargaining for 
either the 1968 or the 1970 [collective bargaining] agreement, 
because the provision imposed significant restrictions on the 
players to which they would never have agreed in good faith 
bargaining.”168  This meant that “the Rozelle Rule did not fall 
within the non-statutory labor exemption and was therefore, 
subject to antitrust review.”169 
 
 164 Id. at 609. 
 165 Id. at 614. 
 166 Id. at 614 (citing Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. 
Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1935)). 
167  Id. at 616. 
 168 Jessica Cohen, Sharing the Wealth: Don’t Call Us, We’ll Call You: Why Revenue 
Sharing is a Permissive Subject and Therefore the Labor Exemption Does Not Apply, 12 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 609, 626 (2002). 
 169 Id. 
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Mackey was a significant win for free agency and signaled a 
crucial gain for the NFLPA against the League’s management.  
However, the Union was still far from strong and proceeded to 
bargain away most of what it had gained from Mackey.170  As the 
new collective bargaining agreement took shape in 1977, instead of 
unlimited free agency, the two sides agreed to a system whereby a 
right of first refusal was coupled with compensation for players 
lost to another team.171  Much would have to change before the 
League’s management considered the NFLPA a force to be 
reckoned with. 
G. Trying to Gain Yardage: The Growth of the NFLPA 
In 1982, the 1977 collective bargaining agreement was set to 
expire and the relationship between the NFL’s management and 
the NFLPA was tense.172  A work stoppage was imminent.173  
After several failed CBA negotiations, the players went on strike 
on September 21, 1982.174 
Several issues divided the owners and the players.  Following 
an NFLPA convention in Albuquerque, New Mexico, the players 
adopted a proposal that “called for players to be paid 55% of the 
clubs’ league-wide revenues.”175  The revenues were then to be 
divided among the players “based on years of service, playtime 
and individual and team performance.”176  Outraged by the terms 
of this proposal, the owners refused to accept the players’ offer.177  
The other sticking point was free agency.178  The owners 
vehemently opposed free agency, as they viewed it as “destructive” 
to league competition.179 
 
 170 Goplerud, supra note 151, at 23.  
 171 Id. at 24. 
 172 See id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 See id. 
 175 History: The 1980’s—Era of Change, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, 
http://www.nflplayers.com/About-us/History (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) [hereinafter 
History: The 1980’s].   
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Goplerud, supra note 151, at 24. 
 179 Id. (noting that the league owners were particularly mindful of the “destructive 
consequences” of free agency). 
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The strike continued for almost two months.180  Owners 
resisted any modification to the first refusal scheme.181  
Eventually, however, the players and owners would settle as both 
realized “the season would be canceled unless regular season 
games resumed in early November.”182  As part of the settlement, 
the owners agreed to a guaranteed player salary/benefit package 
“worth at least $1.28 billion over the 1983–1987 seasons.”183  
Ultimately, the owners got the better end of the bargain in the new 
agreement.184  The agreement “did not include free agency, but 
rather it merely fine tuned the right of first refusal system.”185  
Moreover, this proved to be the beginning of the end of Ed 
Garvey’s tenure as NFLPA executive director.186 
In 1983, following Garvey’s departure from his post as 
executive director, the NFLPA unanimously elected Gene 
Upshaw187 to fill the position.188  Upshaw’s first objective was to 
meet with the players and find out what they wanted from 
management when the 1982 CBA expired in 1987.189  Most agreed 
that free agency was of the utmost importance.190  Unmoved by the 
Union’s persistence, the owners rejected the players’ demands for 
free agency when collective bargaining for the 1987 CBA 
began.191  The players ultimately responded by going on strike 
again during the 1987 season.192  However, instead of continuing 
negotiations during the strike, the owners sought out and hired 
replacement players193 to fill their empty roster spots.194  
 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 History: The 1980’s, supra note 175. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Goplerud, supra note 151, at 25. 
 185 Id. 
 186 Levine & Maravent, supra note 109. 
 187 History: The 1980’s, supra note 175. Upshaw was NFLPA President during the 
1982 CBA negotiations and Strike. Id. 
 188 Goplerud, supra note 151, at 25. 
 189 See History: The 1980’s, supra note 175. 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. The replacement players were mostly comprised of players already cut during the 
1987 preseason. Id. 
 194 Levine & Maravent, supra note 109. 
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Additionally, some veteran players crossed the picket line due to 
financial concerns and a lack of belief in the free agent system.195  
It was clear to the Union that a strike would not work if the owners 
were willing to replace the NFL players with second-class talent 
and if some Union members continued to play in NFL games.  
Thus, the Union ended the strike on October 15, 1987.196  Refusing 
to give up its fight completely, however, the Union also filed an 
antitrust suit against the NFL challenging the League’s right of 
first refusal system.197  The lawsuit was Powell v. NFL.198 
In Powell, the district court ruled in favor of the players in 
January 1988.199  The court held that the 1987 collective 
bargaining impasse ended the nonstatutory labor exemption that 
the owners and Union otherwise enjoyed while the 1987 CBA was 
in effect.200  As a result, the court found that the first refusal 
system was subject to antitrust scrutiny and did in fact violate 
antitrust law.201 
The owners appealed the ruling, hoping for a reversal of the 
decision.202  However, as a precaution, the owners also executed 
“Plan B,” a system which released players at the bottom of the 
roster from the first refusal system.203  Under the “Plan B” system, 
each club could restrict the free agency movement of thirty-seven 
players from their respective rosters and continue to subject them 
to the first refusal system.204  “Players who were not restricted 
 
 195 History: The 1980’s, supra note 175. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Powell v. NFL, 678 F. Supp. 777 (D. Minn. 1988).  The named plaintiff was NFLPA 
President, Marvin Powell. Id. 
 199 Id. at 789. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Powell v. NFL, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989).   
 203 As a precaution, the owners implemented “Plan B,” which freed players at the 
bottom of the roster from the first refusal/compensation system.  Under the Plan B 
system, which was implemented in 1989, clubs could restrict thirty-seven players and 
continue to subject them to the first refusal system.  Players who were not restricted could 
sign with other clubs between February 1 and April 1 without restriction. See Ari Nissim, 
The Trading Game: NFL Free Agency, the Salary Cap, and a Proposal for Greater 
Trading Flexibility, 11 SPORTS LAW. J. 257, 260 (2004). 
 204 Powell, 930 F.2d at 1304. 
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could sign with other clubs between February 1 and April 1 
without restriction.”205 
On November 1, 1989, the owners got what they were looking 
for on appeal: the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
holding.206  The circuit court found that the nonstatutory labor 
exemption protected the owners beyond impasse and that as a 
result, the Union could not bring an antitrust suit against the 
owners for implementation of a rule that was the product of good 
faith bargaining.207  The Eighth Circuit’s holding sent the Union 
back to the drawing board. 
H. Calling an Audible: Decertifying the Union 
While the Union had little to show for its latest legal battle with 
the League’s management, it took notice of Judge Gerald Heaney’s 
dissent, which suggested a brave move: break up the Union so that 
the nonstatutory labor exemption no longer applies.208  Realizing 
that Judge Heaney’s advice might be the only way to prevent the 
League’s management from continuing to restrict free agency, the 
Union formally disbanded on December 5, 1989.209  In place of the 
Union, the players formed the NFLPA as a professional 
association.210  The goal of the new organization was to pursue 
litigation on behalf of individual players and challenge the “Plan 
B” system.211 
In 1990, a lawsuit was filed on behalf of New York Jets 
Running Back Freeman McNeil.  In this case, McNeil v. NFL,212 
McNeil argued that “Plan B” rules restricting free agency violated 
antitrust law and that the “Plan B” system was not immune from 
antitrust scrutiny.213  After the district court found that the 
 
 205 History: The 1980’s, supra note 175.   
 206 Powell, 930 F.2d at 1293. 
 207 Id. at 1304. 
 208 Id. at 1304–07 (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
 209 History: The 1980’s, supra note 175. 
 210 History: 1990’s—The Growth of the Union, NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, 
http://www.nflplayers.com/About-us/History (last visited Nov. 7, 2010) [hereinafter 
History: The 1990’s]. 
 211 Id. 
 212 Civ. No. 4-90-476, 1992 WL 315292 (D. Minn. 1992). 
 213 See Goplerud, supra note 151, at 30. 
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NFLPA’s change in status meant that the owners were no longer 
exempt from antitrust law, a jury trial ensued.214  The players 
finally got the result they were looking for.  The jury found that the 
“Plan B” system violated antitrust law in that it: “(1) had a 
substantially harmful effect on competition, (2) significantly 
contributed to competitive balance in the NFL, (3) [was] more 
restrictive than necessary to achieve competitive balance in the 
NFL, and (4) the players would be economically damaged as a 
direct result of ‘Plan B.’”215 
Having dealt a heavy blow to the League’s management in 
McNeil v. NFL, the players sought a restraining order to stop the 
NFL’s management from enforcing the “Plan B” system.  In 
Jackson v. National Football League,216 the court found that “Plan 
B” prevented the players from becoming free agents and that as a 
result, they were likely to suffer irreparable harm.217  Accordingly, 
the court granted the injunction against the League management’s 
enforcement of “Plan B,” signaling a turning point in the players’ 
relationship with the NFL’s management.218 
I. Keeping the Drive Alive: From Reggie White to the Current 
CBA 
With the owners’ antitrust protection greatly diminished, the 
players intensified their attack.  The NFLPA’s leaders filed yet 
another lawsuit in 1992, White v. NFL,219 seeking true free agency 
and monetary relief.220  Realizing that the players had obtained 
increased bargaining leverage from McNeil and Jackson, the 
owners began settlement talks with the players involved in 
White.221  Ultimately, a settlement was reached in 1993 after both 
sides compromised.222  This settlement would shape the foundation 
 
 214 See id. 
 215 Nissim, supra note 203, at 261 (quoting McNeil, 1992 WL 315292, at *1). 
216  802 F. Supp. 226 (D. Minn. 1992). 
 217 See Nissim, supra note 203, at 261 (citing Jackson v. Nat’l Football League, 802 F. 
Supp. 226, 226 (D. Minn. 1992)).   
 218 Jackson, 802 F. Supp. at 228. 
 219 836 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Minn. 1993), aff’d, 41 F.3d 402 (8th Cir. 1994). 
 220 Id. 
 221 Levine & Maravent, supra note 109, at 1445. 
 222 Id. 
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of the 1993 CBA as the players and owners came to a consensus 
on a league-wide salary cap,223 free agency, revenue sharing, and 
the rookie pool system.224  Having achieved labor peace, the 
NFLPA became a certified union once again.225 
Between 1993 and 2010, the NFLPA and the NFL’s 
management have extended their 1993 CBA five times.226  During 
this time period, the NFL was the only league of the four major 
United States professional sports leagues not to experience a work 
stoppage due to a labor dispute.  Most recently, a CBA extension 
took place in March 2006 when both sides voted to extend the 
CBA through the 2011 season.227 
However on May 20, 2008, League owners unanimously voted 
to opt out of this agreement.228  At the time, the reasons given for 
the early termination included high labor costs, cost problems with 
the rookie system, and the owners’ inability to recoup the bonuses 
of players who subsequently breached their contracts or refused to 
perform.229  Under the terms of the 2006 CBA, the 2010 season 
operated as the agreement’s final year because the NFL’s 
management had opted out.230 
 
 223 The salary cap is an adjustable calculation that sets a team’s maximum payroll for a 
league year. Redding & Peterson, supra note 18, at 98. 
 224 Nissim, supra note 203, at 261.  Rookie contracts are limited under the CBA by a 
salary cap within the overall league salary cap referred to as the “rookie pool.” Facts 
About NFL Rookie Contracts, NFL PLAYERS, http://www.nflplayers.com/Articles/Public-
News/Facts-about-NFL-Rookie-Contracts (last visited Feb. 1, 2011). 
 225 See History: The 1990’s, supra note 210. 
 226 Levine & Maravent, supra note 109, at 1446. 
 227 Id. 
 228 See Daniel Kaplan, NFL Owners Feel No Choice but to Opt Out of Current CBA 
Deal, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. DAILY (May 20, 2008), http://www. 
sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/121003. 
 229 John Clayton, NFL Owners Vote Unanimously to Opt Out of Labor Deal, ESPN 
(May 20, 2008), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3404596. 
 230 See NFL, NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the NFL Management 
Council and the NFL Players Association, Art. LVIII § 3(a) (Mar. 8, 2006). 
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III. DELAY OF GAME: THE CURRENT LABOR DISPUTE BETWEEN THE 
NFL’S MANAGEMENT AND THE NFL PLAYERS 
During the current NFL labor dispute, the NFL’s management 
and the NFLPA have continuously tried to negotiate toward a new 
CBA.  However, the parties face numerous obstacles that may 
prevent them from reaching an agreement.  The primary issue 
between the two bargaining parties relates to the current revenue 
split between players and owners.231  Secondary issues include 
decreasing the cost of rookie salaries through a rookie wage 
scale,232 changing the length of the regular season from sixteen to 
eighteen games,233 the NFL Personal Conduct Policy (the 
“Policy”),234 and the League’s policy regarding player discipline 
for on-field actions.235 
A. The Revenue Dispute 
The biggest issue separating the NFL’s management and the 
NFLPA is the revenue split between the players and the owners.236  
Under the current CBA, the players receive almost 60% of total 
league revenue237 leaving owners with the remaining roughly 
40%.238  The owners want to amend the revenue split agreed to in 
the 2006 CBA by increasing their allocation of revenue.  The NFL 
team owners argue that the current distribution is unsatisfactory 
because they are “losing money per game due to the increased 
 
 231 See NFL, Union to Discuss New CBA Today as Sides Remain Far Apart, STREET & 
SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. DAILY (Jan. 5, 2010), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily. 
com/article/135943 
 232 See Levine & Maravent, supra note 109, at 1475. 
 233 See Roger Goodell: Owners Want 18 Games, ESPN (Aug. 26, 2010), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=5497448 [hereinafter Owners Want 18 
Games]. 
 234 Redding & Peterson, supra note 18, at 100–01. 
 235 Barry Wilner, Football Big Hits: Players Want More Say in Discipline for Illegal 
Hits, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 11, 2010, 5:05 PM), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/11/football-big-hits-players_n_782315.html?ref=tw 
[hereinafter Wilner, Football Big Hits]. 
 236 See Redding & Peterson, supra note 18, at 98–100. 
 237 See id. at 98. 
 238 Id. 
C06_CORAPI_20110425 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2011  6:42 PM 
2011] HUDDLE UP 817 
expenses of operating a franchise239 (e.g., stadium 
development).”240 
Conversely, “the NFLPA claims that the owners are not only 
earning a profit each year, but that the values of the NFL 
franchises are increasing at a rapid rate.”241  In support of this 
point, it has been pointed out that “the NFL’s revenue has 
increased 43 percent since 2006 to $9.3 billion.”242  Complicating 
matters is the fact that the League will not release any related 
financial information, arguing that the NFLPA knows the League’s 
financial situation and is aware that the NFL’s largest costs are 
player salaries.243 
In response to the League’s unwillingness to reveal its financial 
data, many players have begun giving the NFLPA their backing to 
decertify the Union in the event of a labor lockout.244  By 
disbanding the Union, the labor exemption to antitrust law would 
no longer apply to the NFL owners and the NFL players could sue 
the League under antitrust law, arguing that the labor lockout 
constituted a group boycott by the owners.245 
Public scrutiny and pressure have also intensified the 
negotiation process.  On August 6, 2010, two senators weighed in 
on the labor dispute, urging the NFL’s management and the 
NFLPA to come to some sort of resolution before a work stoppage 
 
 239 In recent years, “the cost of building stadiums for professional sports franchises has 
increased beyond the ability for owners or even public entities to pay for them alone.” 
See Cost of Building Sports Stadiums Skyrockets, SAN DIEGO 6,  
http://www.sandiego6.com/news/local/story/Cost-of-Building-Sports-Stadiums-
Skyrockets/InsCySsu10CXMnNkV5JT6g.cspx. 
 240 Redding & Peterson, supra note 18. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Sally Jones, NFL Owners Want Guarantees that no Other Business Provides, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/ 
16/AR2011021603846.html. 
 243 See Levine & Maravent, supra note 109, at 1475 (“The NFL is not going to provide 
any financial information to the Union because it is not claiming an inability to pay.”). 
 244 See, e.g., Steelers Players Vote to Decertify the Union if Needed, YAHOO!SPORTS 
(Oct. 6, 2010, 4:48 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/news?slug=txsteelersnflpa 
(explaining that the Steelers are at least the tenth group of players to vote to decertify if 
necessary, joining players from the Packers, Bengals, Bills, Colts, Cowboys, Saints, 
Eagles, Redskins and Giants). 
 245 Liz Mullen, NFLPA Seeks Authority to Decertify, http://aol.sportingnews.com/ 
nfl/feed/2010-09/nfl-labor-talks/story/nflpa-seeks-authority-to-decertify. 
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occurs.246  Senator George LeMieux (R-FL) argued that the 
country cannot afford the more than 125,000 layoffs that would 
come with an NFL lockout.247  A spokesman for the Union 
responded that the “[p]layers recognize that the business of the 
NFL impacts the businesses of America in a profound way.  A 
lockout puts jobs at risk.  We continue to work diligently to 
prevent a lockout.”248  While several NFL owners and executives 
finally expressed hope this past October that the CBA could be 
renewed before expiring, the actions of the NFL and the NFLPA 
tell a different story.249  For example, the NFL’s management is 
building a nearly $900 million lockout fund financed from its 
savings.250  Similarly, the NFLPA is building its own reserves to 
cope with the effects of any future work stoppage.251 
B. Rookie Salaries 
While player contracts in other United States professional 
sports leagues are guaranteed,252 the NFL’s player contracts 
traditionally have not been.253  This trend, however, has recently 
changed, especially for top NFL rookies.254  “While the top five 
draft picks in 2002 secured an average of twenty-seven percent of 
their compensation guaranteed, the top five picks in 2010 got fifty-
 
 246 See Eamon Javers, Two Senators Urge NFL to Resolve Labor Disputes, CNBC (Oct. 
13, 2010, 3:13 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/39655215. 
 247 Id. 
 248 Id. 
 249 See Daniel Kaplan, NFL Pools $900M for Labor Fight, STREET & SMITH’S SPORTS 
BUS. J., Nov. 1, 2010, at 01, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/dallas/news/ 
2010/11/01/nfl-pools-900m-for-labor-fight.html?s=print (reporting that both the NFL and 
the Union are saving funds in case they fail to agree to a new CBA). 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. 
 252 When a contract is “guaranteed,” it means that regardless of whether the player 
performs well or gets injured during the course of the contract and cannot perform, he 
still receives the full value of his contract. Rachel Bachman, Trend in Guaranteed Money 
in NFL Contracts Pays Big for Ndamukong Suh, Other Potential Stars, OR. LIVE (Aug. 6, 
2010, 10:30 AM) http://blog.oregonlive.com/nfl/2010/08/trend_in_guaranteed_money_ 
in_n.html.  
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. (explaining that when news of 2010 NFL draft pick Ndamukong Suh’s contract 
broke, the most important part of it was not the total compensation of the contract ($68 
million) but that $40 million of the contract was guaranteed). 
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nine percent.”255  Reining in inflated rookie salaries is one of the 
issues on which both the League and the NFLPA can come to an 
agreement.256 
The owners would like to see rookie salaries capped or reduced 
in some way due to the unprecedented cost that owners are 
incurring to obtain top college talent.257  Veteran players, making 
up a large portion of the NFLPA, would also like to see rookie 
salaries managed in a more cost-effective way out of respect for 
seasoned NFL players.258  Nevertheless, the League and the Union 
remain apart on what should be done to remedy this problem. 
“The League is proposing that a rookie wage scale and a 
mechanism that credits against NFL club owners’ expenses be 
implemented into the new CBA.  Under this proposal, these 
expenses will be deducted from revenues that determine the NFL 
salary cap, thereby providing cost savings.” 259  Alternatively, “the 
NFLPA has put forth the idea of a ‘Proven Performance Plan,’ 
which would shorten the duration of standard rookie contracts 
from four years to three,” but would make rookies unrestricted free 
agents after their contracts expire.260  The League argues that the 
unrestricted free agent provision would render the NFLPA’s 
proposal ineffective because although rookie salary costs would be 
reduced due to shorter contracts, unrestricted free agency would 
destroy the League’s “competitive balance.”261 
 
 255 Id. 
 256 See Mawae: Big Rookie Contracts Like Ryan’s ‘Disheartening,’ ESPN (May 21, 
2008, 4:43 PM), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3406508&source= 
NFLHeadlines (quoting NFLPA President Kevin Mawae as saying that Matt Ryan’s six-
year, $72 million rookie contract with the Atlanta Falcons was “a little disheartening” 
because a “young guy” who had never stepped on a NFL football field was getting “paid 
that kind of money”). 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id.  NFLPA president Kevin Mawae explaining that “[a]s a guy who has been in the 
league for 14 now going on 15 years and being around other veteran guys, for a young 
guy to get paid that kind of money and never steps foot on an NFL football field, it’s a 
little disheartening to think of.” Id. 
 259 Levine & Maravent, supra note 109, at 1479–80. 
 260 Doug Farrar, The Real Story Behind the Rookie Wage Scale, YAHOO!SPORTS, 
http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/blog/shutdown_corner/post/The-real-story-behind-the-rookie-
wage-scale?urn=nfl-260642 (last visited Nov. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Farrar, Rookie Wage 
Scale]. 
 261 Id. 
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Augmenting the divide is the fact that many NFL fans across 
the country have become incensed that as most Americans 
continue to suffer through the worst recession in decades, NFL 
rookie contracts and player contracts in general have continued to 
inflate.  While the press has criticized both the NFL’s management 
and NFLPA for this phenomenon, both parties have publicly 
placed the blame on each other.262  This has only made 
negotiations more difficult. 
C. The Eighteen Game Season 
The NFL’s management would like to increase the number of 
regular season NFL games from sixteen to eighteen.263  This is 
because the addition of two regular season games would allow the 
NFL team owners to generate more revenue over the course of a 
season from ticket sales, merchandise, etc.264  To implement this 
plan, owners propose keeping the season at its current twenty-week 
length, but “reducing the number of preseason games from four to 
two”265and adding two of those games to the regular season 
schedule. 
Across the League, however, “many players question the 
wisdom of making an already grueling season even longer,” while 
also limiting regular season preparation time.266  Players propose 
that an eighteen-game regular season should include “changes in 
the rules governing injured players” and “an extra bye week”267 to 
deal with the added hardship of a longer regular season.268  The 
players feel that while the season would still be twenty weeks long, 
additional regular season games pose a greater risk of injury 
 
 262 Id. 
 263 Owners Want 18 Games, supra note 233. 
 264 See id. (quoting Bob Kraft, owner of the New England Patriots, as saying, “I think 
it’s a win-win all around”). 
265  Id. 
 266 Id. 
 267 A “bye week” is a week during which a team does not have to play a game. Tom 
Stryker, Inside Look at NFL Bye Weeks, SPREAD, http://www.thespread.com/ 
forum/topic/Inside-Look-at-NFL-Bye-Weeks/74233/?p=214345 (last visited Jan. 31, 
2011).  Currently, each team is given one bye week over the course of an NFL regular 
season. Id. 
Id. 
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because regular season games are more competitive than preseason 
games.269 
In response to the players’ proposal, Miami Dolphins owner, 
Stephen Ross, publicly defended the League’s eighteen-game plan: 
[T]he studies [on additional regular season games] 
show [that it] will not really increase injuries.  
We’re still playing 20 games.  We’re eliminating 
two preseason games and adding two regular season 
games, which is really what helps with the 
revenues, and make[s] the fans a lot happier and 
those games will be a lot more meaningful.  But in 
terms of the players, they’re still playing 20 
games.270 
The NFLPA quickly fired back on Twitter saying, “this is the 
kind of statement that drives players crazy.  Every game is a risk of 
injury . . .”271 
Critically, New England Patriots owner Robert Kraft 
explained, “I really think going to an 18-game season is critical to 
us getting a labor deal.  There’s not a lot [of] ways in this 
economic environment we can generate incremental revenues.  
That’s the best way.”272 
D. The NFL Personal Conduct Policy 
The NFL Personal Conduct Policy states that “[a]ll persons 
associated with the NFL are required to avoid “conduct detrimental 
to the integrity of and public confidence in the National Football 
League.”273  This requirement applies to players, coaches, other 
 
 269 Longer Season Carries Injury Risks, SPORTS & STARS (Nov. 24, 2010, 1:40 PM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/ articles/85304/20101124/longer-season-carries-injury-risks-nfl-
players.htm. 
 270 Sarah Talalay, Dolphins Owner Irks Players Union with Comments on 18-Game 
Season, BUS. OF SPORTS—SUN SENTINEL BLOGS (Nov. 18, 2010), 
http://blogs.trb.com/sports/custom/business/blog/2010/11/dolphins_owner_irks_players_
un.html. 
 271 Id. 
 272 Owners Want 18 Games, supra note 233. 
 273 Casinova O. Henderson, How Much Discretion is Too Much for the NFL 
Commissioner to Have Over the Players Off-the-Field Conduct? 17 SPORTS LAW. J. 167, 
170 (2010). 
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team employees, owners, game officials, and all others working for 
the NFL.274  The Policy gives the NFL’s Commissioner the 
ultimate authority to discipline any violator of the Policy and the 
power to review any appeal.275  The Commissioner’s authority to 
discipline players flows directly from the CBA, the NFL Player 
Contract, and the NFL Constitution and Bylaws.276 
In 2007, the Policy underwent a massive overhaul when 
Commissioner Goodell extended it to include players’ off-the-field 
conduct.277  In defending this change, Commissioner Goodell 
stated, “We hold ourselves to higher standards of responsible 
conduct because of what it means to be part of the National 
Football League . . . this policy is a further step in ensuring that 
everyone who is part of the NFL meets that standard.”278 
However, Commissioner Goodell’s implementation of the new 
conduct policy was arguably a “unilateral change in employment 
terms and conditions” of the CBA because the Union did not have 
the opportunity to negotiate or engage in collective bargaining with 
the League over the Policy’s changes.279  Thus, the Policy has 
become a sticking point for the players.  The Union and its leaders 
believe that Commissioner Goodell’s implementation of the Policy 
reaches too far and “provide[s] no guidelines in the application of 
fines and/or suspensions due to off-field behavior.”280  The NFLPA 
would also like to have an independent arbitrator hear appeals of 
League discipline.281 
Complicating negotiations, Commissioner Goodell’s decision 
to extend the Policy to off-the-field conduct has been largely 
vindicated by several players’ high profile off-the-field 
 
 274 Id. 
 275 Id. at 170–71. 
 276 Id. at 175. 
 277 See Redding & Peterson, supra note 18, at 100. 
 278 Goodell Issues Memo Enforcing Player Safety Rules, NFL.COM (Oct. 20, 2010, 5:51 
PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d81b7b9ef/article/goodell-issues-memo-
enforcing-player-safety-rules. 
 279 Henderson, supra note 273, at 185–86. 
280    See Andrew Brandt, Roethlisberger, Favre and the NFL’s Personal Conduct Policy, 
FORBES (Oct. 13, 2010, 1:09 PM), http://blogs.forbes.com/sportsmoney/2010/10/13/ 
roethlisberger-farve-and-the-nfls-personal-conduct-policy. 
 281 Id. 
C06_CORAPI_20110425 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2011  6:42 PM 
2011] HUDDLE UP 823 
transgressions.282  Since the Policy’s extension, Commissioner 
Goodell has suspended players such as Marshawn Lynch for three 
games for carrying a concealed firearm,283 punished Michael Vick 
for his role in a dog fighting operation for up to six regular season 
games,284 suspended Donte Stallworth indefinitely for killing a 
man while driving intoxicated,285 and suspended Ben 
Roethlisberger for four games after a twenty-year-old female 
college student accused him of sexually assaulting her in a Georgia 
nightclub.286 
One of the more interesting facets of this issue is that team 
owners are caught somewhere in between Commissioner Goodell’s 
policy extension and the players’ respective positions.  Owners do 
not want to see their players get suspended, but they also do not 
want team patrons to think that they condone crude and sometimes 
criminal behavior.  For this reason, some team owners have 
advocated for the greater use of a team-enforced, rather than 
league-enforced, personal conduct policy.287 
E.  Player Discipline for Illegal Hits 
An emerging issue between the League and the players has 
been the League’s cracking down on what constitutes an illegal hit 
during the course of a football game.  Following a series of 
devastating plays in games played on October 17, 2010, that left 
multiple players seriously hurt with head, neck, and other related 
 
 282 Redding & Peterson, supra note 18, at 100–01. 
 283 Id. at 100. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. 
 286 Roethlisberger Suspended by NFL, ESPN (Apr. 22, 2010), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ nfl/news/story?id=5121614. 
 287 See NFL to Announce Tougher Player Conduct Policy Next Week, STREET & 
SMITH’S SPORTS BUS. DAILY (Mar. 22, 2007), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/ 
article/110530 (“It looks strange to the public when a player misbehaves and nothing 
happens.”). 
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injuries,288 the League ramped up its regulation of helmet-to-
helmet hits.289 
Commissioner Goodell explained: 
One of our most important priorities is protecting 
our players from needless injury.  In recent years, 
we have emphasized minimizing contact to the head 
and neck, especially where a defenseless player is 
involved.  It is clear to me that further action is 
required to emphasize the importance of teaching 
safe and controlled techniques, and of playing 
within the rules.  It is incumbent on all of us to 
support the rules we have in place to protect 
players.290 
Following Commissioner Goodell’s statement, the League 
imposed a $75,000 fine and three $50,000 fines on four players 
who committed fouls under the revamped discipline system.291 
Many NFL players believe they should have a greater voice in 
handing out fines and suspensions for illegal hits.292  Currently, all 
plays are reviewed by the League’s officiating and operations 
offices.293  The players are interested in making sure that some of 
those reviewers are their peers.294  Commissioner Goodell said the 
League is opposed to player reviewers, emphasizing that he is not 
part of the fines process; appeals are heard and decided by Hall of 
Fame player Art Shell and former NFL coach Ted Cottrell.295  The 
 
 288 Helmet-to-Helmet Hits Draw Ire of NFL’s Fromer VP of Officiating, AOL NEWS 
(Oct. 18, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.aolnews.com/2010/10/18/helmet-to-helmet-hits-
draw-ire-of-former-vp-of-officiating. 
 289 Id. A helmet-to-helmet hit occurs when the defensive player leads with his helmet to 
strike the offensive player’s helmet in the course of making a tackle on the offensive 
player. Id. 
 290 Danny Cox, NFL Notifies Teams of New Illegal Hit Discipline with Letter and 
Video, EXAMINER (Oct. 21, 2010, 6:47 PM), http://www.examiner.com/nfl-in-
national/nfl-notifies-teams-of-new-illegal-hit-discipline-with-letter-and-video. 
 291 Wilner, Football Big Hits, supra note 235.  
 292 Id.  
 293 Id. 
 294 Id. 
 295 Id. 
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NFL’s management and the NFLPA jointly pay their salaries.296  
Nevertheless, players have expressed concern about the subjective 
nature of the appeals system.297   
Buffalo Bills safety George Wilson views all of these issues as 
intertwined with negotiations for a new CBA.298  Wilson 
explained: “It’s imperative for the [U]nion to feel like they have a 
voice in the disciplinary process, at least have a voice at the table.  
I know that can come in a lot of capacities and aspects, but guys 
just want to feel like their voices are heard.”299 
IV. TOUCHDOWN: USING MEDIATION TO REACH A NEW CBA 
Positive working relationships are vital in all businesses, 
including professional sports.300  Thus, “bitter negotiations in 
sports labor disputes can lead to unique problems.”301  This is 
especially true when the labor dispute involves collective 
bargaining. 
While both the NFL’s management and the NFLPA have a 
mutual interest in each other’s success and should work together to 
reach a new CBA, parties involved in these types of labor disputes 
often become entrenched in their positions and publicly fight 
caustic and financially draining labor battles.302  Indeed, NFL team 
owners have already declared that the players should not receive as 
much revenue as they are currently receiving.303  In retaliation, the 
players have publicly questioned the integrity of the owners’ 
claims that they are financially strapped, threatened to decertify the 
Union, and threatened to sue the League in the event of a 
 
 296 Id. 
 297 Id. 
 298 Id. 
 299 Id. 
 300 Peter Kupelian, The Use of Mediation for Resolving Salary Disputes in Sports, 
KUPELIAN ORMOND & MAGY, http://kompc.com/289/articles/the-use-of-mediation-for-
resolving-salary-disputes-in-sports (last visited Nov. 12, 2010). 
 301 Id. 
 302 Id. 
 303 See Redding & Peterson, supra note 18, at 98–100. 
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lockout.304  The effect of these actions is that two parties that 
otherwise need each other to thrive have publicly humiliated one 
another, alienated their fan base, and made it harder to work 
together toward reaching a new CBA. 
Mediation is an ideal remedy for resolving labor disputes in 
professional sports and helping the NFL’s management and the 
NFL players reach a new CBA.  It provides the best forum for 
open communication, which can be used to preserve and advance 
the parties’ working relationship, it offers an expedited and 
financially rewarding way to come to a resolution, and it offers 
both parties a sense of privacy.305 
A. Mediation Can Preserve and Foster Working Relationships 
Mediation takes into consideration the human toll of conflict 
and fosters healthier communication between disputants.306  It also 
allows for the parties’ collaboration in the decision making process 
and mutual satisfaction in the outcome.307  This is critical for 
resolving the NFL labor dispute because as Buffalo Bills safety 
George Wilson explained, “Guys just want to feel like their voices 
are heard.”308 
The ability to foster positive outcomes and mutual decision 
making can be realized through the use of a mediator.309  This 
person, chosen by both parties, is trained to bring about 
collaborative resolution by providing an environment of 
neutrality.310  Therefore, given the NFL management’s view that 
AFL-CIO President, Richard Trumka, could not provide for a 
 
 304  See Union Head Says Owners Set for Lockout, ESPN (Oct. 5, 2010, 6:51 PM), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=5652700. 
 305 Kupelian, supra note 300 (“[M]ediation remains a relatively cheap first step at 
attempting to resolve a dispute that may potentially reach tens of millions of dollars.  A 
mediator’s pay can be analogized to the fee for visiting of psychiatrist, or perhaps 
preventive investments in a tangible good.”). 
 306 Kathleen C. Wallace, A Proposal for the United States Olympic Committee to 
Incorporate Formal Mediation Within its Grievance Process, 16 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 
59, 65 (2005). 
 307 Id. at 69. 
 308 Wilner, Football Big Hits, supra note 235. 
 309 Wallace, supra note 306. 
 310 Kupelian, supra note 300. 
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neutral environment as mediator, Trumka’s offer to mediate the 
NFL CBA negotiations was flawed in a critical respect. 
However, while Trumka might not be the ideal candidate to 
mediate this dispute, he has the right idea.  The infusion of a 
neutral mediator into a hostile labor dispute can make a great 
difference in the dispute’s outcome.  This is especially true when 
the parties have a long and tumultuous negotiation history, as the 
NFL’s management and the NFLPA do.  The mediator can help 
identify and address each party’s key issues and goals, while 
keeping each party focused on building a brighter future, rather 
than focusing on a bitter past.311 
 The mediator can also encourage positive working 
relationships by engaging each party in private discussions during 
the mediation.312  During the course of a negotiation, disputants do 
not always feel comfortable sharing their private issues and/or 
negotiation goals with one another.  Typically when this occurs, 
negotiations will either stall or reach an impasse.313  However, in 
the mediation setting, the mediator can call a private caucus to 
prevent this from happening.314  A private caucus occurs when the 
mediator talks with each party and its lawyers in confidence.315  
During the private caucus, the mediator will listen to each side’s 
concerns and agree not to divulge any of this information until 
clearance is received from each party.316  In the meantime, this 
information can help the mediator shape negotiations and 
encourage good-faith bargaining aimed at creating a resolution that 
meets both parties’ needs.317 
Here, caucusing could assist with the production of critical 
NFL financial information relating to the League’s profitability.318  
 
 311 Id. 
 312 Id. 
 313 Id. 
 314 Id. 
 315 Id. 
 316 Id. 
 317 Id. 
 318 See AFL-CIO Prez, supra note 7. 
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This, in turn, would be an enormous step toward helping the 
parties reconcile their differences and reaching a new CBA.319 
B. Mediation Can Expedite a Resolution and Save Money 
Not surprisingly, when high-profile disputes arise and 
communications begin to break down, it can be difficult to get 
negotiations back on track.320  Rather than working together, 
parties will often resort to insulting each other in the media, 
stockpiling assets to fund a protracted conflict, and adopting a 
wait-and-see approach to negotiations.321  The conflict drags on 
and reaches a juncture where multiple egos become involved in the 
dispute, making a joint resolution unlikely.322  The time and money 
spent on defending each party’s position also becomes significant 
and irretrievable.323 
The NFL labor dispute has already begun to resemble this 
unproductive model of conflict resolution.324  As this conflict 
continues, the likelihood of both parties suffering through long, 
costly, and publicly bitter litigation greatly increases.325  It also 
increases the likelihood of both parties experiencing enormous 
financial losses due to game cancellations.326 
What both parties need to realize is that not only will mediation 
be far more sensible in resolving their dispute, it will also be faster 
and cheaper.327  These are crucial benefits as the current CBA ends 
in March 2011 and the tentative start of the 2011–2012 season is 
less than a year away. 
 
 319 Id. 
 320 Kupelian, supra note 300. 
 321 See, e.g., Darrelle Revis Contract Talks with Jets to be Kept out of Public Eye, 
NESN.COM (Aug. 12, 2010, 2:49 PM), http://www.nesn.com/2010/08/darrelle-revis-
contract-talks-with-jets-to-be-kept-out-of-public-eye.html; see also Kaplan, NFL Pools 
$900 for Labor Fight, supra note 249. 
 322 See Wallace, supra note 306, at 64. 
 323 See id. 
 324 See Kaplan, NFL Pools $900M for Labor Fight, supra note 249. 
 325 See, e.g., Liz Mullen, NFLPA Seeks Authority to Decertify, DALLAS BUS. J. (Sept. 
13, 2010, 9:11 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/dallas/stories/2010/09/13/daily1.html 
(stating that the NFLPA intends to decertify so that it may file an antitrust challenge). 
 326 Wilner, Lockout, supra note 21. 
 327 Wallace, supra note 306, at 64. 
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Mediation offers the parties a set mechanism for early 
engagement with one another and an opportunity to take control of 
their problems before they become unsolvable.  The parties can 
elect to have the right and ability to control the identity of the 
mediator, the timing and scheduling of the sessions, the nature of 
discussions, and the confidentiality of the negotiations.328  In 
addition, the cost of having to pay a mediator is negligible in 
comparison to the cost the parties would incur if the 2011 season 
were cancelled and/or this dispute were to be litigated.329 
For the NFL’s management, the reduced expenditure on labor 
negotiations increases funds available to support other League 
initiatives and promote the game of football.  For the players, the 
increased time and money allows for better offseason training and 
a greater focus on the upcoming season. 
C. Mediation Can Help Prevent a Public Relations Disaster 
Public relations are important in any industry.  However, 
professional sports leagues are especially dependent on public 
reaction.330  A professional sports league’s inability to gauge 
public reaction can lead to negative effects on business and must 
be reversed as early as possible to stop irreparable harm and loss of 
public confidence.331  While many professional sports leagues have 
traditionally been sluggish in reacting to public outcry and 
negative publicity, the NFL has been quite adept in the past at 
responding to its fans’ demands and promulgating socially 
responsible initiatives and policies.332  These include NFL Play 
60,333 the NFL and United Way Hometown Huddle,334 and 
 
 328 Kupelian, supra note 300. 
 329 Id. 
 330 See Greenberg, Sports Facility Leases, supra note 28, at 101–02. 
 331 Kupelian, supra note 300 (explaining that both MLB and the NBA have suffered for 
failing to take fan interest and public concern into account). 
 332 See, e.g., Goodell Issues Memo Enforcing Player Safety Rules, supra note 278 
(“[A]s an employee of the NFL or a member club, you are held to a higher standard and 
expected to conduct yourself in a way that is responsible, promotes the values upon 
which the league is based, and is lawful.”). 
 333 NFLRUSH, http://www.nflrush.com/play60 (last visited Jan. 31, 2011).  NFL PLAY 
60 is a national youth health and fitness campaign focused on increasing the wellness of 
young fans by encouraging them to be active for at least sixty minutes a day. Id. 
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League-enforced sanctions against teams for employee 
misconduct.335 
Although labor disputes are only a part of the public relations 
puzzle, long and drawn out public CBA negotiations between the 
NFL owners and the players will negatively impact the NFL’s 
overall public perception, and ultimately, its business.336  This is 
especially the case when during a national recession, the majority 
of the parties’ negotiations center on which party should receive 
the greater share of billions of dollars in revenue.337  Further 
adding to the public relations concern is that if the parties do not 
come to a resolution and a work stoppage does occur, many 
American cities will lose millions of dollars and thousands of 
jobs.338 
Mediation will offer the public hope that this dispute could be 
resolved at an earlier stage, while also limiting the parties’ public 
display of greed and pettiness during negotiations.339  Even though 
mediation may not resolve the dispute immediately, ground rules 
could be established requiring confidentiality during the course of, 
and in between mediation sessions.  This would minimize adverse 
media commentary on the NFL labor dispute’s status and thereby 
limit negative public reaction.  It would also prevent either party 
from misrepresenting the other’s proposals in the press and from 
using the court of public opinion to try hotly contested labor issues, 
which only fuels interparty animosity and makes negotiating a new 
CBA nearly impossible.340 
 
 334 NFL and United Way, UNITED WAY CAPITAL AREA, http://unitedwaycapitalarea.org/ 
partners/nfl_and_united_way.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2011). Hometown Huddle is a 
national day of community service, during which NFL players and representatives from 
each of the thirty-two NFL teams lend aid and assistance to members of their 
communities. Id. 
 335 See Goodell Issues Memo Enforcing Player Safety Rules, supra note 278 (explaining 
that as a result of negative league publicity stemming from player incidents, NFL teams 
will be disciplined when their employees, including players, violate the league’s personal 
conduct policy). 
 336 Kupelian, supra note 300. 
 337 AFL-CIO Prez, supra note 7. 
 338 Id. 
 339 Kupelian, supra note 300. 
 340 Farrar, Rookie Wage Scale, supra note 260. 
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Ultimately, nothing can limit the public relations headache that 
the NFL will experience if there is a work stoppage next season.  
However, mediation can help put a cap on the negative publicity 
that the NFL’s management and the NFLPA receive as labor 
negotiations continue and can increase the likelihood that the 
public relations nightmare of an NFL work stoppage never 
materializes. 
V. INSIDE THE HUDDLE: CONDUCTING THE MEDIATION 
Having realized the benefits that mediation affords the parties, 
the NFL’s management and the NFLPA agreed to enter into 
mediation on February 17, 2011.341  Choosing mediation is an 
important step toward saving the 2011–2012 NFL season and 
avoiding the significant job and money losses that could occur in 
the event of a work stoppage.342  However, now that the NFL’s 
management and the NFLPA have opted for mediation, the 
mediation sessions must be structured and conducted in a way that 
will encourage consensus between the parties.  Otherwise, any 
mediation session that the parties hold will prove futile in resolving 
this labor dispute. 
A. Picking a Referee: The Mediator 
As the NFL’s management correctly states in its response to 
Richard Trumka’s September 30, 2010, letter, any mediator that is 
going to mediate the NFL’s CBA negotiations must be a mutually 
agreed upon neutral third party.343  For several reasons, this is a 
fundamental precept of mediation344 that both the NFL’s 
management and the NFLPA have followed in appointing the 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (“FMCS”), an 
independent United States government agency, to oversee the 
 
341  NFL, Players Union Agree to Mediation in Labor Negotiations, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (Feb. 17, 2011, 3:55PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/football/nfl/ 
02/17/nfl-union-mediation.ap/index.html. 
 342 See AFL-CIO Prez, supra note 7. 
 343 Id. 
 344 See What is Mediation?, supra note 30. 
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mediation.345  FMCS director George H. Cohen346 will be the 
mediator.347 
First, having a mutually agreed upon mediator makes both the 
NFL’s management and the NFLPA responsible for the role that 
the mediator plays in conducting the mediation and gives each 
party an equal stake in how the mediation process is managed.348  
This assures both parties’ interest and commitment to having a 
productive mediation.349  Furthermore, agreement over the 
mediator can often be symbolic of a change in tone between 
disputing parties and signal the first of several compromises to 
come.350  This would be particularly true in the case of this labor 
dispute as both the NFL’s management and the NFLPA have 
refused to concede any ground on all key labor issues and continue 
to have vitriolic exchanges.351  Lastly, having a neutral third party 
mediator is the primary way to ensure that both the NFL’s 
management and the NFLPA trust each other and the mediation 
process.352  This is crucial because successful mediation hinges on 
the parties being comfortable with exchanging their respective 
bargaining positions and willingness to work together to achieve 
mutual gains.353  The parties will not do this if they do not trust 
each other or if the mediator is being coercive and fails to protect 
the parties’ interests adequately and equally.354 
Given the unique nature of the professional sports industry and 
this labor dispute, it is also important that the mediator have 
 
345  See NFL, Players Union Agree to Mediation, supra note 341. 
346  George H. Cohen has extensive sports labor relations experience having been 
involved in the NBA’s, the NHL’s, MLB’s and Major League Soccer’s past CBA 
negotiations. See id.  
347  Id. 
 348 ROBERT FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN 27 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991).  
 349 Id. 
 350 Jeff Carlisle, A Glimmer of Hope in the CBA Talks, ESPN, http://soccernet. 
espn.go.com/columns/story?id=751412&sec=mls&root=mls&cc=5901 (last visited Feb. 
9, 2011). 
 351 Jim Corbett, Analyst Sees Way to Avert Stoppage, USA TODAY, Jan. 31, 2011, at 7C. 
 352 Kupelian, supra note 300. 
 353 See JACQUELINE M. NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A 
NUTSHELL 74–75 (3d ed. 2008). 
 354 See AFL-CIO Prez, supra note 7. 
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significant experience mediating comparable types of labor 
negotiations.355  Having a mediator with professional sports league 
labor relations expertise, such as George H. Cohen, provides many 
advantages that would not otherwise be afforded to the NFL’s 
management and the NFLPA. 
First, a mediator with this type of experience is likely to 
already comprehend the extensive labor relations history and 
current struggle between the parties.356  This will allow the 
mediation process to move swiftly and efficiently which is vital 
because the parties do not have long before the current CBA 
expires.357  Second, as often is the case with professional sports 
league CBA negotiations, here, the parties to the dispute are large 
organizations, with sizable labor relations teams made up of 
attorneys, businesspeople, and former players.358  A mediator with 
Cohen’s experience understands how to manage the different 
personalities and egos that will inevitably accompany any 
mediation session(s) and that would otherwise threaten the 
productivity of the mediation process.359  Third, the consequences 
of failing to reach a new CBA could be devastating.360  This will 
likely create a pressure-packed atmosphere during mediation and 
as negotiations move forward.361  A mediator such as Cohen, who 
has been in this position before, is in the best position to handle 
this hostile atmosphere and can exert a calming influence over the 
 
 355 Kupelian, supra note 300. 
 356 History, NFLPA, http://www.nflplayers.com/About-us/History (last visited Feb. 5, 
2011). 
 357 Kupelian, supra note 300. 
 358 Greg Rosenthal, NFLPA: “Any Suggestion We Want a Lockout Is Coming From 
Outer Space,” NBCSPORTS (Jan. 13, 2011, 1:28 PM), http://profootballtalk.nbcsports. 
com/2011/01/13/nflpa-any-suggestion-we-want-a-lockout-is-coming-from-outer-space. 
 359 See Edwin P. Ahrens, Why Should I Care?, MEDIATE, http://www.mediate.com/ 
articles/ahrens30.cfm (last visited Feb. 4, 2011). 
 360 See AFL-CIO Prez, supra note 7 (explaining that a lockout could cost thousands of 
Americans their jobs and cities more than $140 million in revenue). 
 361 Doug Farrar, Ochocinco Grills Goodell During Commissioner’s Press Conference, 
YAHOO!SPORTS (Feb. 5, 2001, 9:09 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com/nfl/blog/shutdown_ 
corner/post/Video-Ochocinco-grills-Goodell-during-Commissio?urn=nfl-317260 
(explaining that player anxiety is only going to grow as the deadline date for the 
expiration of the current Collective Bargaining Agreement gets closer)[hereinafter Farrar, 
Ochocinco]. 
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already anxious parties by laying out a framework for how 
mediation should proceed.362 
B. Officiating the Game: The Mediator’s Role 
Ultimately, Cohen cannot force the NFL’s management and the 
NFLPA to agree on a new CBA.363  However, the role that he 
plays will have a profound impact on the outcome of this dispute.  
It will be up to Cohen to “[interpret] concerns, [relay] information 
between the parties, [frame] the issues, and [refocus] the 
problems.”364 
As previously stated, the anxiety level at any mediation session 
that occurs between the NFL’s management and the NFLPA has to 
be high.365  With so much riding on the negotiations, the pressure 
is going to mount with each successive session.366  For this reason, 
Cohen must remain a composed third party that can control the 
negotiations when necessary.367  In particular, Cohen should do 
three things during the course of the mediation process to help 
ensure that mediation is as successful as possible. 
First, Cohen should obtain an understanding of what each 
party’s view of the situation is from the outset of mediation.368  By 
understanding each party’s position and goals, Cohen can 
determine how each mediation session should proceed.369  To do 
this, it would be wise for Cohen to conduct separate meetings with 
both the NFL’s management and the NFLPA before any joint 
mediation sessions begin.370  This would prevent the parties’ 
hostilities from getting in the way of Cohen’s comprehension of 
the key issues.371 
 
 362 See NOLAN-HALEY, supra note 353, at 82. 
 363 Id. at 70 (explaining that in mediation, the mediator cannot impose a decision on the 
parties). 
 364 Id. at 85. 
 365 See Farrar, Ochocinco, supra note 361. 
 366 Id. 
 367 See NOLAN-HALEY, supra note 353, at 82. 
 368 Id. at 75. 
 369 Id. 
 370 Id. 
 371 Id. 
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Next, Cohen should confer with the parties at the outset of 
mediation to determine what the mediation schedule is going to 
be.372  Setting out a schedule at the beginning of mediation helps 
the NFL’s management and the NFLPA establish a concrete 
meeting plan and steady dialogue.  This would be of particular help 
in the case of this dispute as the parties have been unable to 
maintain consistent dialogue regarding CBA negotiations since 
labor talks first began in June 2009.  Once mediation starts, the 
sessions will become contentious at times.373  Either party could 
desire to walk away from mediation.374  However, having a 
previously agreed upon schedule is an effective prophylactic to this 
type of problem because it is a constant reminder from the outset 
that both parties are dedicated to seeing the mediation process 
through to the end and reaching an agreement. 
Finally, Cohen will have to know when to call a “timeout.”  If 
it appears that a resolution may be difficult to achieve during a 
joint session, Cohen should request to meet separately with the 
NFL’s management and the NFLPA in private caucuses.375  This 
will allow each party to confidentially share sensitive information 
and any concerns it has with how negotiations are proceeding.  
Moreover, if the NFL’s management is unwilling in a joint session 
to produce the League financial data that the NFLPA has 
requested, Cohen should urge the NFL’s management to produce 
this information during its private caucus.  Cohen would then have 
the opportunity to review the data and interpret its meaning.  After 
considering the financial information, Cohen could make an 
objective recommendation during the next joint session as to how 
League revenue should be divided in the new CBA.  So long as the 
NFLPA is informed of the fact that Cohen’s recommendation is 
based on the NFL management’s full financial disclosure during 
the private caucus, the NFLPA would have little reason to object to 
Cohen’s proposal and the NFL’s management would not have to 
 
 372 Id. 
 373 Chris Mortensen & Adam Schefter, Sources: Sides Could Talk this Week, 
ESPN.COM (Feb. 11, 2011), http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=6119630 
[hereinafter Mortensen & Schefter, Sides Could Talk]. 
 374 Chris Mortensen, NFL-Union Talks Canceled, ESPN (Feb. 11, 2011), 
http://m.espn.go.com/nfl/story?storyId=6107737. 
 375 See NOLAN-HALEY, supra note 353, at 83. 
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reveal the contents of its financial data to the NFLPA.  This 
compromise, in turn, would be a monumental step toward 
resolving this labor dispute as it would significantly alleviate 
tensions over the revenue split, the primary issue separating the 
parties.      
C. The NFL’s Management and The NFLPA: What Must Happen 
While Cohen can significantly influence the outcome of 
mediation, it will be up to the NFL’s management and the NFLPA 
whether to agree on a new CBA.376  Given that the NFL’s 
management and the NFLPA have already had negotiations 
regarding a new CBA, both parties have an understanding of what 
the other is seeking.377  Thus, the parties should view mediation as 
an opportunity to compromise on outstanding labor issues so that a 
new CBA is reached.  However, for the mediation process to be 
successful, several things must happen between the parties during 
the course of mediation. 
First, the mediation process will only work if the parties are 
willing to bargain in good faith.378  The parties have to be honest 
with one another and must actually desire a resolution of this 
dispute for mediation to be effective.  With such a great deal of 
animosity built up between the parties, this could prove difficult.379  
However, it will be up to the parties to put their emotions aside and 
realize that working together to reach an agreement is the only way 
to stave off disaster. 
Next, assuming that the parties are willing to bargain in good 
faith, the NFL’s management must be more forthcoming with 
financial information.  So far, the NFL’s management has refused 
to disclose financial statements to the NFLPA in support of their 
position that teams are losing money.380  However, production of 
this information is essential for a successful negotiation between 
the parties because it is the only way to demonstrate to the NFLPA 
 
 376 Id. at 75. 
 377 Mortensen, NFL-Union Talks Canceled, supra note 374. 
 378 See NOLAN-HALEY, supra note 353, at 100. 
 379 See Mortensen & Schefter, Sides Could Talk, supra note 373. 
 380 See AFL-CIO Prez, supra note 7. 
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that the owners’ position regarding the revenue split is justified.381  
Failure to produce this information only lessens the NFL 
management’s credibility and makes it less likely that a 
compromise over the distribution of league revenue will be 
reached.  As this is the pivotal point of contention between the 
NFL’s management and the NFLPA, resolution of this issue is 
essential to reaching a new CBA.382 
Last, the parties need to agree to keep confidential the 
substance of each mediation session.  To their detriment, both the 
NFL’s management and the NFLPA have roused public concern 
over this labor dispute by using the media to vilify one another and 
gain support for their respective positions.383  As previously stated, 
this has only heightened tensions between the parties and made 
agreement more difficult.384 
For good faith bargaining to occur and for mediation to be 
effective, the parties must be able to engage in the mediation 
process without having to worry that their words will be used 
against them or misconstrued.385  Agreeing that the content of the 
mediation sessions will be kept confidential virtually guarantees 
that this will happen and allows the parties to have open and honest 
negotiations.386  This, in turn, makes reaching a new CBA far more 
likely. 
CONCLUSION: THE POST GAME SHOW 
It is time for the NFL’s management and the NFLPA to 
demonstrate their commitment to reaching a new CBA.  Properly 
conducted mediation “promotes dignity and respect for [parties’] 
interests, addresses the root cause of conflict, and allows for 
resolutions that satisfy the interests of all parties.  It is efficient, 
 
 381 Id. 
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strengthens relationships of trust and respect, . . . and controls 
unnecessary expenditure of resources.”387 
In an organization where positive relationships are necessary 
for owners and players to achieve success, conflict can be costly.388  
Properly conducted mediation “creates the opportunity for conflict 
to bring about productive outcomes,”389 and therefore, should play 
an integral part in the NFL management’s and the NFLPA’s 
collective bargaining process and in future labor disputes between 
management and players in professional sports leagues.  It is time 
to huddle up.   
 
 387 Wallace, supra note 306, at 71. 
 388 Id. 
 389 Id. 
